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ABSTRACT. This article analyses the emergence of the political myth of 
Pëtr Stolypin and its recent institutionalization as an exemplary image for 
Russian politics. The article considers the memory of Stolypin together with the 
myth of the Time of Troubles, that served the Putin regime well in its first and 
second terms, to demonstrate how the post-revolutionary frame of reference 
implicit in the latter has been replaced by the pre-revolutionary frame of 
“stability Stolypin-style”: a new brand of stability-oriented state patriotism that 
taps into the very same societal fears and insecurities connected to memories 
of the 1990s, but is geared to fit a situation in which recent accomplishments 
have to be safeguarded against the perceived threat posed by domestic rather 
than foreign enemies. Instead of promising a stable and prosperous future, the 
Stolypin myth cautions that recent achievements can all too easily be lost 
again.  
Key words: Politics of Memory, Stolypin, Putin, Russia, Fear of Revolution 
 
 
On 27 December, 2012 president Vladimir Putin and prime minister Dmitri 
Medvedev unveiled a 4.6 metre high bronze statue of Pëtr Stolypin in 
downtown Moscow. The statue, by sculptor Salavat Shcherbakov, was 
placed in sight of the House of Government of the Russian Federation. The 
unveiling marked the end of the Stolypin year in commemoration of the 
150th anniversary of the birth of the pre-revolutionary politician. Stolypin 
served as minister of the interior and subsequently as prime minister from 
1906 until his assassination in 1911 by Socialist-Revolutionary and secret 
police agent Dmitrii Bogrov. Stolypin’s name is generally associated with 
his agrarian reforms and his efforts to repress the terrorist movement in the 
wake of the 1905 revolution. He is also noted for his rhetorical skills and 
Stolypin’s speeches before the Duma have become a much-used source of 
                                                            
1 “Cтабильность по-Столыпински” (Nadein 2012, online source). 
ІДЕОЛОГІЯ І ПОЛІТИКА ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И ПОЛИТИКА IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS 
 
 
№ 1(5), 2015                                                                                                                                                                                                           
38
political one-liners. The phrases “They are in need of great upheavals, but 
we are in need of a Great Russia”2 and “Give the state twenty years of 
internal and external peace, and you will not recognize present-day 
Russia”3 are the most popular.  
Stolypin has come to symbolize a political system that is 
characterized by reform-from-above and oppression of the opposition, 
combined with the aim of creating stability and stimulating economic 
growth. The level of authoritarianism that this system implies is portrayed 
as a necessary evil in achieving the higher goal of restoring and 
maintaining Russia’s greatness. In addition, it is often justified by pointing 
out the unique visionary leadership of Stolypin, a tendency that bears a 
resemblance to the personification of state power in the figure of Putin 
over the twelve year period of his rule as president and prime minister up 
until then. This article analyses the construction and meaning of the myth 
of “stability Stolypin-style [stalbil’nost’ po-Stolypinskii]” (Nadein 2012, 
online source) under Putin and the interplay between different actors in the 
political, societal, cultural spheres in this process of political memory 
making. 
The emergence of the political myth of Stolypin and its 
institutionalization as an exemplary image for Russian politics is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The Putin regime has actively drawn upon 
historical images to underline the necessity of the increase of state control, 
most notably by presenting the 1990s as the latest incarnation of the early 
seventeenth century Time of Troubles, that was brought to an end by 
Putin’s reforms. Drawing upon widespread feelings of social anxiety, this 
narrative was aimed at shaping the perception of the political state of 
affairs as post-revolutionary and, therefore, favourable. Contrary to other 
political myths that have been employed since 2000, the image of Stolypin 
has not been actively used by a previous political regime, neither Soviet, 
nor post-Soviet. In fact, the image of Stolypin in Soviet historiography was 
explicitly negative. In their appraisal, historians followed Lenin, who 
“denounced the prime minister as the ‘hangman-in-chief,’ or simply as a 
hangman, tyrant, reactionary, or ‘pogrom-maker’” (Asscher 2001, p. 3). The 
statue of Stolypin in Kiev, erected in 1913, was taken down following the 
1917 revolution and, quite symbolically, replaced by Karl Marx. The bust of 
                                                            
2 “Им нужны великие потрясения, нам нужна Великая Россия”. 
3 “Дайте Государству 20 лет покоя, внутреннего и внешнего, и вы не узнаете нынешней Poccии”. 
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Stolypin in present-day Ulianovsk met a similar fate. Stolypin’s name 
became especially associated with two images: “Stolypin’s necktie” 
[Stolypinskii galstuk] and the “Stolypin carriages” [Stolypinskie vagony]. The 
first refers to a quote by Cadet Duma member Fëdor Rodichev who coined 
the term in 1907 to criticize the field courts-martial established under 
Stolypin to trial terrorist revolutionaries. In Soviet historiography, and 
consequently history education, it came to symbolize the cruel repressive 
character of Stolypin’s politics. The railway carriages that were used to 
transport peasant migrants to Siberia also acquired a negative connotation 
in later years. While colonization of the Far East was actively promoted and 
supported by the tsarist state under Stolypin, the move was voluntary and 
migrants were transported on newly-built, ordinary trains (Asscher 2001, p. 
323). In the Stalinist era, however, the same route was traversed by trains 
equipped with bars to transport convicts to the prison camps. Today, the 
term “Stolypin carriage” is still used to refer to carriages specially equipped 
to transport convicts.  
The perestroika period saw a renewed interest in pre-revolutionary 
Russia and a positive reappraisal of Stolypin’s politics. Publishing house 
Molodaia Gvardiia, for example, released a complete collection of 
Stolypin’s speeches in the Duma and State Council in 1991. The volume 
carried as its subtitle “We are in need of a Great Russia [Nam Nuzhna 
Velikaia Rossiia]”, the second half of his famous quote and indicative of the 
motivation behind publishing the volume in the final days of the Soviet 
Union’s existence. The preface outlines the radically opposed 
interpretations of the importance of the tsarist prime minister and the 
“myths and legends”4 (Stolypin 1991, p. 8) associated with his name. The 
hope is expressed that the publication of the collected volume of speeches 
will provide professional historians with the material to reconsider and 
correct prevalent views (ibidem, pp. 7-8). In essence, the Soviet argument 
was turned inside out: in the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s 
advocates of his memory re-framed Stolypin, who now came to be seen as 
“a farsighted statesman whose policies were precisely the ones Russia 
needed to develop into a prosperous, stable, and powerful country” 
(Asscher 2001, p. 5). This position was often accompanied by the belief 
that, had Stolypin not been assassinated, the complete implementation of 
his reforms would have averted the revolution. The two seemingly 
                                                            
4 “мифы и легенды”. 
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irreconcilable assessments of Stolypin as a statesman, one Soviet and one 
counter-Soviet, mark the inherent complexity of the memory: both 
tyrannous despot and visionary leader who would have saved Russia from 
the horrors of revolution and war, had it not been for his tragic death. 
Vladimir Nadein (2012, online source) aptly summarizes how proponents of 
Stolypin have attempted to merge both aspects into a positive image: 
“Cruel, but far-sighted. For the good of the country. For the sake of a 
radiant future. He hanged [convicts], but also raised [the country] from its 
knees. He hanged, but also gave the country [a higher] GDP. All of Great-
Britain spread our Siberian butter onto their sandwiches in the morning. 
The rouble became heavier than gold. The export of grain increased several 
folds”5.  
While historians and politicians “rediscovered” the legacy of Stolypin 
as the Soviet Union disintegrated, indicators of public opinion in Russia 
paint a rather different picture. Polls executed by the Levada Center over 
the period of twenty years indicate that Stolypin has never been very 
popular (Gudkov 2010, p. 39). Respondents were asked to name five to ten 
names of who they believed were the most outstanding persons of all 
times and nations. In 1989 and 1991 less than one per cent named 
Stolypin. In 1994, the figure rose to eight per cent. It then dropped to one 
per cent in 1999, to finally rise to four per cent by 2008. Considering these 
figures, it is surprising that Stolypin was elected as the second most 
popular Russian of all time in 2008 in the nationally televised competition 
The Name is Russia [Imiia - Rossiia], with Aleksandr Nevskii and Stalin 
finishing in first and third place, respectively. This article aims to 
reconstruct how the memory of Stolypin was mediated in the Putin period 
and, in this process, continually reinterpreted to such an extent that the 
government felt itself confident enough to adopt it officially. It furthermore 
reflects on the particularities of the Stolypin myth that contributed to its 
popularization and institutionalization in this particular period, as 
compared to earlier periods. In its analysis of the political appropriation 
and institutionalization of the myth it furthermore takes into consideration 
earlier indicators of political interest in this image. 
 
                                                            
5 “Жестоко, но дальновидно. Во благо страны. Ради светлого будущего. Вешал, но и поднимал с колен. 
Вешал, но и давал стране ВВП. Вся Британия по утрам вмазывала в свои сэндвичи наше сибирское 
масло. Рубль тяжелел золотом. Экспорт зерна возрос в разы”. 
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Institutionalization of the Myth 
Stolypin has been part of Putin’s political vocabulary from the very 
beginning of his presidency. In his first Annual Address to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2000, Putin explicitly referred to 
Stolypin to discuss the difficulty in striking a balance between state 
interest and the rights of the individual. He stated: 
Over the past decade, fundamental changes have taken place in the 
country – rights and freedoms of the individual are guaranteed by the 
Constitution, a democratic political system has formed, and a multi-party 
system has become reality. […] 
However, the letter of the law and real life are often quite different 
things. Only the framework of a civil society has been formed in Russia. 
Collective, patient work is now required for it to become a full partner of 
the state. We are not always able to combine patriotic responsibility for the 
destiny of our country with what Stolypin once called “civil liberties”. So it 
is still hard to find a way out of a false conflict between the values of 
personal freedom and the interests of the state (Putin 2000, online source). 
Other commentators have also indicated a connection between the 
challenges faced by Putin at the start of the new millennium and those that 
stood before Stolypin following the 1905 revolution. In discussions of 
Stolypin’s reforms from the early 2000s, and more specifically in the 
appraisal of why Stolypin would have been exceptionally adept at carrying 
them through, we can even trace parallels to the characterization of Putin 
himself. V. Loginov (2004, p. 22), for example, notes the following four 
characteristics: firstly, “he came, as it were, ‘out of nowhere’”; secondly, “he 
was young – forty-four years old”; thirdly, “he gave the impression of being 
a tough and decisive individual, a ‘strong personality’ capable of imposing 
‘order’”; and finally, “he was able to express his thoughts in a precise and 
laconic manner”. In the concluding paragraph Loginov explicitly embeds 
the discussions on Stolypin in the context of contemporary Russian politics. 
He states: 
In today’s discussions of the mature, overblown, but still-unresolved 
problems of national life, the most frequently expressed fears are of a 
‘new dictatorship.’ This is not what we should fear. It is, rather, the 
unwillingness to take into account popular sentiments and the people’s 
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will that marks the high road to sweeping grass-roots upheavals (ibidem, 
p. 27). 
In other words, the establishment of a strong state should not be 
judged negatively, as (Western) observers of the process of democratization 
in Russia have done for most of Putin’s and Medvedev’s presidencies, as 
long as the political line does not come into conflict with the sentiments of 
the general public. 
If we consider societal actors beyond the ruling elite that have 
sponsored the emergence of the memory of Stolypin early on, we should 
note the Pëtr Stolypin National Prize for the Agrarian Elite. The award was 
called into existence in 2002 as a private initiative (Natsional’naia Premiia 
imeni Petra Stolypina n.d., online source). The first awards were presented 
in 2003. The purpose of the award is to decorate those who are successful 
in the agricultural sector and also those, who “with their work revive 
Russian traditions, help our rural areas”6 (ibidem). In 2012, the award 
ceremony was included in the official program of festivities connected to 
the Stolypin year and thereby implicitly adopted by the state. The 
foundation behind the Pëtr Stolypin National Prize for the Agrarian Elite 
was one of the main initiators of the celebration of a previous Stolypin 
year, celebrated in 2006 (ibidem). Marking the 100th anniversary of the 
start of Stolypin’s reforms, the event was supported by the Russian 
government. On 20 October, 2006, prime minister Mikhail Fradkov signed a 
directive establishing an organising committee, chaired by Dmitrii 
Medvedev (Government directive N1457-p 2006). While the government 
thus endorsed the 2006 Stolypin year, it did not allocate funds to the 
activities that were organised. Another organisation involved was the Fund 
for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s Legacy (Fond Izucheniia Naslediia P.A. 
Stolypina 2006A, online source). The Fund was established in 2001 by 
historian Pavel Pozhigailo, who held the position of state secretary of 
Culture and Mass communication between 2006 and 2008 (Fond Izucheniia 
Naslediia P.A. Stolypina n.d., online source), a fact which might have added 
to the government’s decision to support the anniversary. The program 
consisted of, amongst other things, a requiem in Stolypin’s honour in the 
Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow and a scientific conference on the 
theme of “The Stolypin model of the modernization of Russia. 1906-2006”7. 
                                                            
6 “своим трудом возрождает российские традиции, помогает нашему селу”. 
7 “Столыпинская модель модернизации России. 1906-2006”. 
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During the final meeting of the organising committee, Medvedev 
highlighted the parallels between the Stolypin era and the present: “Today, 
Russia is faced by similar problems. Therefore the general interest in 
Stolypin as a figure is no coincidence. Many of his ideas and plans are 
indeed relevant as before”8 (Fond Izucheniia Naslediia P.A. Stolypina 
2006B, online source). It is important to note that the basis for the link 
between the two eras, as expressed by Medvedev, lies in the question of 
agricultural reform. The use of the image of Stolypin is principally 
connected to specific policy issues, rather than to his personal 
characteristics, to a type of leadership that he represents, or to an 
autocratic type of governance as we will see later on. This is consistent 
with the function of the historical analogy of Stolypin and Putin that 
Caroline Humphrey (2009, p. 234) has described with regard to agricultural 
reform and the efforts to “deconstruct” the remains of soviet collectivities 
in the post-soviet period:  
What historical analogy does is to draw a parallel between Stolypin’s 
attempt to get more independent-minded peasants to leave their 
communes and set up as private farmers and Yeltsin’s and Putin’s 
policies of disbanding collective farms and promoting ‘fermery’ today. 
Stolypin, in a famous phrase, said that Russia must now ‘place a wager 
on the strong’. In brief, since both Stolypin and Putin attempted to 
impose private individual ownership of agricultural land, what they both 
represent is the destruction of the commune (Italics in original).  
According to Humphrey (2009, p. 235), the generally accepted basis 
for the analogy is that both were “strong proponents of centralized state 
power”, “in charge of the secret police”, and that they “pushed through, 
against fierce opposition, a series of reforms introducing private property in 
agricultural land in Russia”. While the importance of the elements 
mentioned cannot be denied, and indeed continue to inform the use of 
Stolypin’s image, this article argues that since the time of Humphrey’s 
writing the relevance of Stolypin has undergone a significant shift from 
indicating parallels in policy to serving as a personified symbol for 
autocratic leadership.  
To Humphrey, the institutionalization of the Stolypin myth in 2012 
would, in fact, have come as a surprise. Humphrey (2009, p. 240) notes that 
                                                            
8 “Сегодня перед Россией стоят схожие задачи. Отсюда неслучаен общий интерес к Столыпину как к 
фигуре. Многие из его идей и замыслов действительно по-прежнему актуальны”. 
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“the Stolypin-Putin analogy has died away in the last few years”. She 
attributes this development to unresolved contradictions implicit in the 
memory, such as the alleged involvement of the secret police and the tsar 
in Stolypin’s death, and the contradictory appraisals of his repressive 
policies. Moreover, she argues that Putin and Stolypin might be too similar 
in this respect, which makes it difficult to shape Stolypin into a historical 
image that puts his contemporary incarnation in a positive light: 
[…] [T]he whole personalized tangle (the rigid Stolypin, the jealous Tsar, 
the corrupt secret police, the double-dealing revolutionary) is 
reminiscent of the environment of secret police ‘provocations’ that also 
surround Putin. It is another layer of meaning hovering around the 
historical analogy – one, like the assassination itself, of course, that the 
present Russian executive would have to eliminate from public 
consciousness if the analogy is to work in a positive way for the leader 
(Humphrey 2009, pp. 239-240). 
Already in 2008 we can see the shift occurring from historical 
analogy towards a more symbolic function of the memory. In his first 
Address to the Federal Assembly as president in 2008, Medvedev referred 
to Stolypin in his plead for constitutional democracy and increased respect 
for individual freedoms. He stated: 
The Constitution paves the way for Russia’s renewal as a free nation and 
a society that holds law and the dignity of each individual as its highest 
values. 
The cult of the state and the illusory wisdom of the administrative 
apparatus have prevailed in Russia over many centuries. Individuals with 
their rights and freedoms, personal interests and problems, have been 
seen as at best a means and at worst an obstacle for strengthening the 
state’s might. This view endured throughout many centuries. I would like 
to quote Pyotr Stolypin, who said, “What we need to do first is create 
citizens, and once this has been achieved civic spirit will prevail of its 
own accord in Russia. First comes the citizen and then the civic spirit, but 
we have usually preached the other way round” (Medvedev 2008). 
Here, the Stolypin era comes to represent the development of a 
young democracy in the context of stabilization following a period of 
severe turmoil, paralleling the process of democratization that has taken 
place in post-Soviet Russia; thus, a “post-revolution” type of historical 
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analogy. It points at the difficulties involved in the process of establishing 
a representative system of government; the issues that can arise when 
government and Duma must learn how to cooperate in a constructive way 
towards implementing necessary reforms. The balance between the 
collective and the rights of the individual, implicit in this discussion, tends 
towards the individual, which also corresponds to the hope that Russia 
would take important steps toward democratization under Medvedev. 
In 2008 the Russian government also issued a decree that created 
the Stolypin medal. The medal, which is divided into first and second 
degree, was first awarded in 2009 by prime minister Putin. In the decree, 
the purpose of the medal is outlined as follows: 
The P.A. Stolypin medal is an encouragement for the contribution to 
solving strategic problems connected to the social-economic 
development of the country, including the realization of long-term 
projects of the government of the Russian Federation in the fields of 
industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, science, education, 
healthcare, culture and other fields of work (Government decree N388, 
2008).9 
The medal features a relief of Stolypin and the inscription “To the 
glory of Russia, for the good of the Russians”10. Recipients include such 
persons as former minister of finance Aleksei Kudrin (1rst degree, 2010), 
former minister of defence Sergei Ivanov (2nd degree, 2011), and Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii, leader of the ultranationalist Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Russia (2nd degree, 2012). 
In his period as prime minister (2008-2012), Putin has actively 
quoted and paraphrased well-known statements by Stolypin. The elements 
connected to democratization that we found at the beginning of 
Medvedev’s presidency quickly lost ground. They were replaced by a 
symbolic charge that shows similarity to the way the myth of the end of the 
Time of Troubles was used to portray the Putin era as the return of peace 
and stability following the chaotic 1990s. Stolypin, as it were, has become 
yet another wrapper around the promise of stability and economic 
                                                            
9 “Медаль Столыпина П.А. является поощрением за заслуги в решении стратегических задач 
социально-экономического развития страны, в том числе реализации долгосрочных проектов 
Правительства Российской Федерации в области промышленности, сельского хозяйства, 
строительства, транспорта, науки, образования, здравоохранения, культуры и в других областях 
деятельности”. 
10 “Во славу России, во благо россиян”. 
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prosperity the Putin regime has been selling to its electorate for over a 
decade. Consider, for instance, the following sentence Putin pronounced 
during a session of the Duma on 20 April, 2011 that, as is pointed out by 
Pavel Aptekar (2011, online source), evidently echoes Stolypin’s assertion 
that he needed twenty years of peace to transform Russia beyond 
recognition: “The country needs a decade of stable, peaceful development 
without various kinds of rushing, [and] thoughtless experiments, entangled 
in, at times unwarranted, liberalism or, on the other hand, in social 
demagogy”11 (Putin, as quoted in Aptekar’ 2011, online source). On the 
investment forum “Russia calling!”, Putin quoted Stolypin to substantiate 
his claim of Russia being an “island of stability” and “safe haven” for 
foreign investors. Putin’s phrase “We do not need great upheavals, we need 
a great Russia”, altering the first words of the original quote only slightly, 
made headlines in the Russian media (RIA Novosti 7 October 2011, online 
source).  
The main difference between the “end of the time of troubles” 
wrapper and the Stolypin wrapper is, firstly, how they define the threat 
Russia continues to face. While the Time of Troubles narrative places its 
enemies outside of Russia (in particular, in Poland), the narrative of 
Stolypin allows its user to shift attention to enemies located within the 
country. The narrative is particularly adept to framing contemporary 
political issues since Stolypin had to deal with two groups of adversaries 
during his period in office: members of government and the State Duma 
(both conservative and progressive), and extra-governmental opposition in 
the form of such terrorist groups as the Socialist Revolutionary Party’s 
Combat Organisation. Secondly, in the way the memory of Stolypin has 
been used in the past few years, the message changes from a post-
revolutionary reassurance, to a pre-revolutionary cautionary warning. It 
implies that the historically founded rationale for supporting the ruling 
political regime is no longer connected to restoring order after chaos, but 
with maintaining the status quo and preventing a slip (back) into political 
instability and, possibly, a revolution of some sort. This shift from a “post-
revolutionary” to a “pre-revolutionary” frame of reference is in accordance 
with the progressive stages of Putin’s presidency. It reflects the 
development from a state of political consolidation, starting from 2000, to 
                                                            
11 “Стране необходимы десятилетия устойчивого, спокойного развития. Без разного рода шараханий, 
необдуманных экспериментов, замешанных на неоправданном подчас либерализме или, с другой 
стороны, социальной демагогии”. 
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efforts to retain Putin’s position in power, in more recent years. As such, it 
is, in fact, a new way of tapping into the very same societal fears and 
insecurities connected to memories of the 1990s. Instead of promising a 
stable and prosperous future, the Stolypin myth cautions that recent 
achievements can all too easily be lost again. 
Putin defended the choice of Stolypin as a role model at the All-
Russian forum of the agricultural professional class in November 2011 (RIA 
Novosti, 15 November 2011, online source). One of the participants 
challenged the political endorsement of the memory by arguing that 
Stolypin’s reforms were, in fact, unsuccessful. This casts a doubt on 
whether such a person should be made into a guiding figure for 
contemporary politics. In his reply, Putin in particular addressed the 
criticism on Stolypin’s repressive measures by claiming they were 
necessitated by the tumultuous situation following the 1905 revolution. 
Paraphrasing Stolypin, he added: “I hope that [his] descendants can 
distinguish between the blood on the hands of a doctor and the blood on 
the hands of a hangman”12 (ibidem). Putin furthermore contradicted the 
allegation of painting a one-sided picture of the great reformer. He stated: 
“We do not want to idealize the figure of Stolypin, but we want history to 
know all sides of this process [of reform] and all sides of this individual”13 
(ibidem). 
 
The Stolypin Year 
The decree on the Stolypin year was signed by president Medvedev on 10 
May, 2010. The organizing committee was headed by Putin himself and 
consisted of several members of the government (RIA Novosti 18 October 
2011, online source). While the festive year comprised numerous events, 
the erection of the statue can be seen as its most public manifestation. It 
has been extensively commented on in the press from the moment it was 
first announced in mid-2011 up to its revealing in December, 2012. It was 
decided the monument would not receive state financing and the 
necessary funds would be collected from Russian businesses and 
individuals instead. Putin encouraged all members of government to follow 
his example and donate a share of their salary towards the financing of the 
                                                            
12 “Надеюсь, что потомки отличат кровь на руках врача от крови на руках палача”. 
13 “Мы не хотим идеализировать фигуру Столыпина, но мы хотим, чтобы история знала все стороны 
этого процесса и все стороны этой личности”. 
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statue (RIA Novosti 13 July 2011, online source); thereby urging them to 
buy into the memory of Stolypin not only symbolically, by endorsing the 
decision in their capacity as politicians, but also financially on their 
personal title. On the relevance of Stolypin, Putin commented the 
following during one of the meetings of the organizing committee:  
As a true patriot and wise politician, [Stolypin] understood that different 
kinds of radicalism are equally dangerous for the country as standing 
still, [as] refusing reorganisation, [and] necessary reforms; [he 
understood] that only a strong, capable state power, supported by the 
private, civic initiative of millions of people, can provide for the 
development, [can] guarantee the order and stability of a vast, 
multinational power, [can] guarantee the inviolability of its borders14 
(ibidem). 
The design for the statue was subject to a competition in which both 
established and young artists took part (Krasnov 2011, online source). The 
final decision was based on popular voting and a professional jury.15 Pavel 
Pozhigailo, the director of the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s Legacy 
that was introduced above and was involved in the organisation of the 
Stolypin year, has commented on how they managed to raise the required 
funds (RBK 27 December 2012, online source). He revealed that a total 
number of over 1500 people from all over the country made a donation. 
This group consisted of about a hundred politicians, political 
representatives and businessmen, and other than that of average citizens 
“of modest means”16 such as pensioners and teachers, who, Pozhigailo 
claims, donated on average half their monthly income. Pozhigailo 
emphasises that the fundraising was not actively propagated and that the 
influx of donations therefore demonstrates that the memory of Stolypin is 
very much cherished by the Russian population. The latter claim can be 
called into question, however, since all traditional media picked up on the 
plans to erect the statue and Putin’s call to follow his example and make a 
                                                            
14 “Настоящий патриот и мудрый политик, он понимал, что для страны одинаково опасны, как разного 
рода радикализм, так и стояние на месте, отказ от преобразований, от необходимых реформ, что 
только сильная, дееспособная государственная власть, опирающаяся на деловую, гражданскую 
инициативу миллионов людей, способна обеспечить развитие, гарантировать спокойствие и 
стабильность огромной, многонациональной державы, гарантировать нерушимость ее границ”. 
15 The Committee on architecture and city-planning of Moscow [Москомархитектура] hosted an 
exhibition of the 42 competing designs where visitors could cast their votes for their favourites. The 
Ministry of Culture rewarded the three most popular designs with a prize of 400 thousand roubles. A jury 
of experts had the final say in selecting the winning design (Belenitskaia 2011). 
16 “обычных людей, как правило, небогатых”. 
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donation. Even so, the idea of employing popular fundraising instead of 
allocating state funds is highly symbolic, of course, as it would imply the 
statue was erected by the Russian people, and not imposed from above by 
the state. Its location next to the House of Government is no less symbolic, 
however, and emphasises the close connection between the public display 
of honour for Stolypin and the ruling political regime. 
Erecting a statue of Stolypin in central Moscow was, in fact, not a 
completely new idea. It was already proposed in 2001 by Nikita Mikhalkov, 
a renowned film director and a highly influential figure in Russian cultural 
affairs. He is also a personal friend and supporter of Putin, and one of the 
most important sponsors of the memory of Stolypin in the cultural sphere, 
as is testified by his personal advocacy of Stolypin in the The Name is 
Russia-project and his documentary on Stolypin that was aired on Russian 
state television in 2012. Back in 2001, Mikhalkov suggested to place a 
Stolypin statue on Lubianka square to replace the highly disputed statue of 
Felix Dzerzhinskii that was taken down in 1991 (Gazeta.Ru 2011, online 
source). The commission on monumental art of the city of Moscow 
considered the suggestion in 2002 but decided not to endorse it since they 
believed “one monument of the reformer in St. Petersburg was sufficient”17 
(Lenta.Ru 16 March 2011, online source). In the same year the city of 
Saratov, where Stolypin served as governor before being appointed 
minister of the interior, did erect a statue of the reformer to mark the 140th 
anniversary of his birth (Pravitel’stvo Saratovskoi Oblasti 14 April 2002, 
online source). The square the monument is set on was named in his 
honour as well. Several years later, in 2011, the city of Krasnodar also 
unveiled a statue (Rossiiskaia Gazeta 6 September 2011, online source). 
This time, the occasion was the 100th anniversary of Stolypin’s 
assassination, rather than his year of birth as was the case with the other 
celebrations.  
The year 2012 has, however, witnessed the largest number of 
Stolypin-related events and commemorations so far. On 26 September, 
2012, a statue of Stolypin was revealed at the State Agrarian Academy near 
Ulianovsk that carries Stolypin’s name since February that same year 
(ARTRUSSIA 26 September 2012, online source). Its sculptor, Zurab 
Tsereteli, is one of Russia’s most well-known artists who, on account of his 
close relationship with the former mayor of Moscow Iurii Luzhkov, has left 
                                                            
17 “эксперты сочли, что одного памятника реформатору в Санкт-Петербурге достаточно”. 
ІДЕОЛОГІЯ І ПОЛІТИКА ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И ПОЛИТИКА IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS 
 
 
№ 1(5), 2015                                                                                                                                                                                                           
50
a (severely criticised) mark on the post-Soviet transformation of the 
Russian capital (Goscilo 2009). Indicative of Tsereteli’s favourable position 
vis-à-vis the Kremlin is the immortalization of Putin in a larger than life-
size bronze sculpture of him dressed in a judo suit. Tsereteli actually 
contested in the selection for the Moscow monument. The design of the 
statue of Stolypin that was placed in Ulianovsk corresponds to the one with 
which he competed. Several sources intimate that Tsereteli, after failing to 
win the bid for Moscow, first offered the statue of a seated Stolypin to the 
city of Kiev. The Ukrainian capital reclined, stating that the memorial 
plaque on the building were Stolypin drew his last breath is sufficient 
(Argumenty i Fakty 28 August 2012, online source; RIA Novosti 30 January 
2012, online source). For that reason, the statue ended up at the Academy 
that made Tsereteli honorary professor in return for his generous gift 
(Ul’ianovskii Portal 26 September 2012, online source). Another statue of 
Stolypin is to be placed in the city centre of Ulianovsk in 2013 (Chilikova 
2012, online source) that will also be made by Tsereteli (BezFormata.Ru 27 
September 2012, online source). Other events connected with the 
celebration of the Stolypin year included an exhibition in the State 
Historical Museum under the name “The last knight of the empire”18; the 
renaming of the Moscow city university of management, a street, and a 
vessel of the Russian navy; a silver two rouble coin with Stolypin’s image 
(Tsentral’nyi Bank Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2012, online source); and a special 
stamp (Filatelisticheskii Obzor 2012, online source). Furthermore, the 
ministry of education gave suggestions on how to dedicate a class to the 
theme of “The lesson of Stolypin”19 in secondary schools (Ministry of 
Education and Science of the Russian Federation 2012, online source). 
 
Conclusion 
How should we interpret the political institutionalization of the Stolypin 
myth that was discussed above? Russian historian Igor Froianov asserts 
that the process of “Stolypinization”20 should be seen in parallel to the 
renewed efforts at destalinization (Froianov 2011, online source). While I 
do not endorse Froianov’s views (he goes on to argue how, in fact, the 
memory of Stolypin can never measure up to the memory of Stalin and is a 
                                                            
18 “Последний витязь империи”. 
19 “Урок Столыпина”. 
20 “столыпинизация”. 
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mere “pigmy”21 in comparison to the soviet “giant”22), the parallel 
development he points out is an interesting observation. The peak in 
attention for Stolypin (2011-2012) indeed came after the peak in the state’s 
leniency toward a positive re-evaluation of Stalin’s legacy abated (Sherlock 
2011).  
As the previous discussion has shown, it would be mistaken, however, 
to see the Stolypin myth as, firstly, a completely new phenomenon and 
secondly, a mere consequence of the need to fill the void left by the 
memory of Stalin. Rather, if we consider the myth of Stolypin together with 
the myth of the Time of Troubles, this provides us with important insights 
on the way the contemporary Russian political regime has tried to utilize 
cultural memory to its advantage. While the narrative of post-revolution, 
implicit in the myth of the End of the Time of Troubles, suited the political 
circumstances during Putin’s first and second terms of presidency, the shift 
from consolidating toward maintaining political power required a 
reconfiguration of the regime’s historical vocabulary. The figure of Pëtr 
Stolypin, constructed here as the great, but unrecognized, visionary leader 
of his time, has filled this gap of memory symbolism. Stability “Stolypin-
style” has become the new brand of stability-oriented state patriotism, 
geared to fit a situation in which recent achievements have to be 
safeguarded against the perceived or imagined threat posed by domestic 
rather than foreign enemies. In this sense, the adoption of the myth of 
Stolypin and the particular way it was shaped, indeed indicates that the 
regime correctly anticipated that its next challenge would come from 
within in the form of increasing societal opposition that culminated in the 
series of street protests in 2011-2012. However, whether the invested 
effort directed at popularizing the image of Stolypin as a historical figure of 
importance has succeeded in familiarizing the general public with his 
“lessons”, as the title of a 2006 TV series on Stolypin intimates,23 remains 








23 Столыпин...Невуыченные уроки (2006). Directed by Iurii Kuzin and broadcast by NTV. 
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